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1  Introduction 
The reach and the persistence of low levels of fertility throughout Europe and 
other parts of the world in recent decades have raised much concern among 
governments: concerns about the impact of such low levels of fertility on 
economic growth, labour force supply and health care, but also concerns—or 
rather questions—about whether or not governments should intervene to attempt 
to increase fertility (Caldwell et al. 2002). The possibility of governmental 
intervention to raise fertility is a highly controversial issue in most countries as 
the decision to have children is usually seen as a strictly private one (Barach et al. 
2005). However, the situation is rendered more complicated when confronted to 
data showing that parents would like to have more children but that they are 
prevented from doing so because of financial and work-related obstacles 
(Goldstein et al. 2003). Our objective at the International Conference that took 
place in December 2007 in Vienna, however, was not to question whether or not 
governments should intervene, but rather to ask the question of whether or not 
policies can enhance fertility.
1 This seemingly easy question is in fact very 
difficult to answer for several reasons. First, while countries provide families with 
a wide range of support, very few of these policy measures have an explicit 
pronatalist objective. In most cases, they instead aim at partly compensating 
parents for the cost of children, at reducing income inequality, at encouraging 
women to join the labour force and/or at increasing gender equality. Second, 
while individuals may consider policies when deciding to have a first or 
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subsequent child, many other factors are also weighed in including non-financial 
ones. And finally, while individuals may have preferences regarding the ideal 
family size and the ideal timing for having children, these preferences tend to 
vary over the individuals’ life-course, thus further complicating the task of 
scholars trying to assess the potential impact of policies.  
The set of papers included in this volume aimed at shedding further light on 
this question by reflecting on the experience of some countries, by examining the 
role of policies in relation to other fertility determinants, and by analysing various 
indicators of fertility. The structure of this introductory article is as follows. In 
Section 2, we provide the background to this special issue by first presenting data 
on fertility and then by attempting to link cross-national differences in fertility to 
other economic, social and institutional differences. This first broad brush stroke 
approach is strictly descriptive but helps situate low fertility in a broader social 
and economic context. In Section 3, we then turn to the question of a possible gap 
between fertility preferences and actual fertility and also examine the reasons for 
low fertility. In Sections  4, 5 and 6 we examine the possible links between 
policies and fertility, first by looking at financial support for families, and then at 
work- and gender-related policies. We conclude in Section 7 by indicating future 
avenues of research. 
 
 
2  A broad brush stroke approach 
Despite the fact that European countries share a common decline in fertility to 
levels below replacement, cross-national variations in the actual level of fertility 
remain large. In 2006, the difference was close to 0.8 children per woman, from a 
minimum of 1.19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 2.08 in Iceland.
2 Then again, these 
figures are based on the total period fertility rate (TFR) and are likely to over-
estimate the actual (cohort) fertility differences between countries (something we 
discuss later in this paper). Figure  1 further illustrates the wide cross-national 
differences in fertility levels. It also reveals an interesting geographical clustering 
of countries with higher-than-average levels in the Nordic countries (but also in 
France, the United Kingdom and Ireland) and lower-than-average levels in 
southern and eastern Europe.  
While these geographical differences are well known and have been 
documented elsewhere (see for example Billari and Kohler 2004), they are a 
useful starting point for our discussion of policies and the role of institutions. In 
particular, it is probably not a coincidence that the relatively higher levels of 
fertility observed in the Nordic countries coexist with a relatively high standard of 
living, low levels of poverty and unemployment, a high degree of gender equality 
and a high level of governmental support for families. In contrast, the low levels 
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of fertility observed in eastern Europe coexist with lower levels of development, 
higher unemployment rates and economic uncertainty, lower degrees of gender 
equality and lower levels of support for families. It is difficult to quantify all of 
these dimensions with cross-nationally comparable indicators. Table  1 is an 
attempt at doing so via three widely used indicators: the UNDP Human 
Development Index, the UNDP Gender Empowerment Index and an overall 
measure of governmental support for families (based on Gauthier 2005). The data 
in Table  1 have furthermore been grouped into six geographical regions that 
reflect the clusters observed in the previous map. France appears on its own in 
this table in view of its higher level of fertility (as compared to its neighbours) 
and its higher level of support for families. 
 
Figure 1: 
Total fertility rate in European countries, 2006 
 
Note: The levels of total fertility rate (TFR) shown on the map are constructed as follows: Lower fertility: TFR 
below 1.40; Medium fertility: TFR between 1.40 and 1.79; Higher fertility: TFR at 1.80 and above. 
 
This exercise is obviously illustrative and rather qualitative, but nonetheless 
nicely contrasts the Nordic countries with the lowest-low fertility countries of 
southern and eastern Europe. It also suggests how the countries’ economic, social 
and institutional context may produce distinct fertility levels. However, the fit is 
not perfect. For example, it does not fully explain the persistence of higher levels 
of fertility in the English-speaking countries despite an average score on the Introduction  4 
Gender Empowerment index and a low level of state support for families. The 
explanation for these countries lies probably somewhere else, possibly in the 
higher level of conservative family attitudes found in English-speaking countries 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000)
3 and in the lower level of expectation towards 
governmental support for families.
4 This table furthermore reveals some 
similarities between the southern and eastern regions with regard to the four 
indicators presented in Table 1. These two regions differ widely in terms of other 
indicators of family formation though, especially their divorce rate, mean age of 
entry into motherhood and percentage of children born out of wedlock.
5 But what 
the table does suggest is that policies directed at each of these three dimensions 
may be potential levers of fertility. 
 
Table 1: 





































Where: +: higher than average; •: average; -: lower than average 
Note: 1- Nordic = Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden; English-speaking = Ireland, UK, USA; Western 
= Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland; Southern = Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern = 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine. 
Source: Own calculation from data published in the European Demographic Data Sheet 2008 and data from the 
UNDP Human Development Report (online) and from Gauthier (2005). 
 
We will discuss later in this paper the evidence regarding the links between 
various policies and fertility. Below, we first turn to the issue of fertility 
indicators and reasons for low fertility.  
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3  Fertility indicators and reasons for low fertility 
TFR vs. tempo-adjusted fertility 
Postponement of births, manifested by an increase in the parity-specific mean age 
at fertility, is known to depress the observed period TFR (Bongaarts and Feeney 
1998). Various measures have been suggested in the literature to correct this so-
called tempo effect. The figures reported in the first two columns of Table 2 are 
based on the formula proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998). They reveal that 
the adjusted TFR approaches replacement level in the Nordic countries, France 
and the English-speaking countries, but that it is considerably lower in eastern and 
particularly in southern Europe. Moreover, the tempo distortion (adjusted minus 
observed TFR) is very low in the countries known for their supportive family 
policies (the Nordic countries and France). What these regional differences 
suggest is that the lower levels of fertility observed in southern and eastern 
Europe may reflect either a lower preference, or desire, for fertility, or higher 
barriers to fertility. These factors may indeed be key to understanding regional 
differences within Europe. However, as seen below, the measurement of 
preferences and barriers is not an easy task. 
 
Fertility ideals vs. actual fertility  
Preferences for children, or norms regarding ideal family size, have been the 
subject of much investigation but they remain very difficult to measure for a 
variety of reasons. In particular, there is a crucial distinction between what is 
perceived as being ideal in one’s own society and what is perceived as being ideal 
for oneself (Testa 2007). Furthermore, fertility ideals tend also to vary 
substantially over the life-course (Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003). Keeping 
these caveats in mind, Table 2 reports data on general and personal fertility 
ideals.6 What is noticeable in this table is that the data on ideal family size match 
those on actual fertility quite nicely: in other words, what we observe is that 
higher values of ideal family size are found in the three regions that have higher 
than average fertility while lower values are instead found in the two regions with 
lower than average fertility. It is also noticeable that fertility ideals are all above 
replacement level in the six broad regions represented here (although they are 
considerably lower in specific countries (Goldstein et al. 2003; Testa 2006)).  
The comparison of fertility ideals and actual fertility is routinely done in the 
literature, with the results usually being interpreted in terms of barriers to fertility 
(Balter 2006). The gap between personal ideal family size and the tempo-adjusted 
fertility appears in the last column of Table  2. The figures are somewhat 
surprising in showing that the gap is as high in the three high fertility regions as in 
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the eastern region. In contrast, it is much larger in southern Europe suggesting the 
possible presence of larger barriers to fertility. 
 
Table 2: 



















































Notes: 1- Nordic: Denmark, Finland, Sweden; English-speaking: Ireland, UK; Western: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands; Southern: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 2- Female respondents age 
15 and above. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation from data published in Testa (2006). 
 
Reasons for low fertility 
Bongaarts (pp. 39-55) considers the gap between ideal and actual fertility as an 
indicator for the existence of barriers to fertility. Along with the tempo effect, he 
identifies economic, social and biological obstacles that prevent people from 
realising their reproductive preferences. Policies may aim at mitigating the effect 
of some of these obstacles. Identification of these obstacles is a difficult task that 
demographers face (it remained out of the scope for Bongaarts’ paper). The 
problem here is that not only many reasons may have led individuals to postpone 
childbearing or to restrict family size, but there is also the obvious risk of post-
hoc rationalising (i.e. to rationalise a decision that took place at an earlier period 
of life). Keeping in mind these limitations, Table 3 presents data on the perceived 
relevance of various circumstances in the decision to have children. The data 
come from the 2006 Eurobarometer survey and are the answers to the question: 
“According to you, how important is each of the following in the decision on 
whether to have or not to have a\another child?” Only results for female 
respondents are reported here. 
Two results are particularly striking in this table. First, there is the very low 
relevance given to economic and work circumstances by respondents in the 
Nordic region, probably a reflection of their relative high standard of living but 
also of the security provided by the welfare system in case of various 
contingencies. Second, and in contrast to the Nordic region, there is the very high 
relevance given to the same two sets of circumstances by respondents in southern 
and eastern European countries. In fact, respondents in the southern and eastern 
regions gave high ranking to all items. This result not only distinguishes 
respondents from these two regions from the others, but also suggests the possible Anne H. Gauthier and Dimiter Philipov  7 
presence of bigger barriers to fertility in these two regions. The western region 
stands again in the middle on all items with the exception of the last one. 
 
Table 3: 
Relevance given to different circumstances in the decision to have children, 2006 
(female respondents aged 15 to 39)
1 a 
Regions





































Notes: 1- Percentage answering ‘very important’ to a given item; 2- Same countries as in Table 2; 3- Includes 
financial situation, costs of children and housing conditions. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation from data published in Testa (2006). 
 
 
4  Financial support for families 
The previous result suggests that economic circumstances may be a barrier to 
fertility—at least in some countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, governments in 
different countries have implemented various financial measures in an attempt at 
encouraging parents to have more children, ranging from birth bonuses and tax 
breaks for children to more generous allowances to higher-parity births. In recent 
years, such measures have, for example, been introduced in Italy (see the paper by 
Boccuzzo et al. in pp. 125-147), Australia (Lunn and Wilson 2008), Russia (CBS 
news 2007) and Korea (Korea Herald 2003). However, the empirical literature 
suggests that such measures tend to have very little impact on fertility and that 
most of the impact tends to be short-term (Gauthier 2007). What seems to be 
happening is that baby bonuses and other such incentives tend to encourage 
parents who were already intending to have a child to have this child earlier rather 
than later, and that they have in contrast little impact on individuals who were not 
at all planning to have another child (see for example Gans and Leigh 2007). On 
the other hand, the literature is not unanimous on this topic. Studies of the birth 
bonus in the province of Quebec in Canada, for example, suggest a positive 
impact on fertility—but at a rather high cost per child (Kim 2007; Milligan 2002). 
An analysis of the effect of a baby bonus in the Italian province of Friuli-Venezia 
Julia, carried out by Boccuzzo et al. (pp. 125-147), shows that the baby bonus 
contributed to an increase in fertility of women with higher parity and lower 
education. Introduction  8 
And even if single policy measures, such as birth bonuses, are not sufficient to 
make a substantial difference in a country’s fertility level, whole packages of 
financial support for families may be more successful. The analysis by Bradshaw 
and Finch (2006) suggests that this could indeed be the case, at least on the basis 
of bivariate analyses. Differences across countries are in fact large when it comes 
to financial support for families and they vary depending on the actual indicator 
used. Figure 2 presents data on cash support for families for twenty-six OECD 
countries for two such indicators: cash support based on the disposable income of 
families with children and childless couples (graph on the left-hand side) and 
expenditures on families as a percentage of national income (graph on the right-
hand side). The data have furthermore been arranged by region, in line with the 
groupings used earlier in this introduction. Despite non-negligible within-region 
variations, the data nonetheless reveal a certain gradient with higher-than-average 
support in the Nordic countries (and also in western European ones) and lower 
support in countries of eastern and southern Europe. 
 
Figure 2: 
Cash benefits for families with children 2003 
Cash support for families






















































Social expenditures on families as a 
percent of gross national income
Source: OECD online tax-benefit calculator. Accessed at www.oecd.org. 
Note: The data refers to the additional disposable income of a dual-earner two-child family as compared to the 
disposable income of dual-earner childless family (in both cases one of the spouse earns 100% of the average 
earnings and the other 67%). Anne H. Gauthier and Dimiter Philipov  9 
This ranking of countries is yet one more indication that support for families 
may indeed matter (in that it correlates with the country ranking on fertility). 
What may also strongly matter for families, however, are the stability of this 
financial support and the status of the overall economy (including job security). 
This argument is very relevant in the case of eastern and central European 
countries where the transitional economies as well as numerous changes to the 
countries’ family policies may have negatively affected couples’ plans to have 





5  Work- and gender-related policies 
The other area of family policy that has attracted much attention on the political 
scene since the 1990s is that of work-family reconciliation. This has been 
particularly the case in the European Union with the adoption of a Council 
Recommendation on child care (March 1992) and a Council Resolution on the 
balanced participation of women and men in family and working life (June 2000). 
Specific targets for child care provision were furthermore stated by the European 
Council of Barcelona (in March 2002) and by the European Council in its 
European Pact for Gender Equality (in March 2006): the aim being to remove 
disincentives to female labour participation (Špidla 2007). Partly as a result of 
these initiatives, but also driven by an overall wish to better support working 
parents in their combination of work and family responsibilities, most countries 
have introduced, or extended, various policies in recent years. Figures 3 and 4 
summarise the national provisions regarding parental leave and child care.  
Cross-national differences are relatively large including within the different 
regions analysed earlier. Overall regional characteristics are therefore less clear. 
Nonetheless, and in general, the Nordic countries stand out in their large support 
for working parents through a combination of long parental leave and relatively 
high child care coverage. At the other extreme of the distribution, one finds the 
English-speaking countries and southern European countries, both characterised 
by a low level of support for working parents. The consequences of theses 
regional and national differences for families are large especially for women. 
Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007a,b) have for example estimated that the 
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penalties associated with motherhood tend to be smallest in the Nordic countries 




Maternity, paternity and parental leave, as of 2005-6 



























Maternity leave Paternity leave Paid parental leave
 
Note: All forms of leave are expressed as equivalent full-paid weeks (number of weeks of leave multiplied by 
percentage of wage or earnings received during the leave) 
Source: OECD family policy database. Table PF7.1. Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database 
 
The Nordic countries also stand out in view of their high level of gender 
equality (as seen in Table 1 earlier). Among other things, this translates into a 
higher fathers’ take-up rate of parental leave than in most other countries (Moss 
and O’Brien 2006). Fathers in the Nordic countries continue to take a smaller 
share of parental leave than mothers, but their participation has strongly increased 
in recent years especially following the introduction of specific measures (such as 
the fathers’ quota in Norway in 1993). Another indicator of gender equality is 
fathers’ participation in child care activities, Data in Figure 5 are based on time-
use surveys and express fathers’ involvement in child care activities as a ratio of 
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that of mothers. Again, the data sharply contrast the situation in the Nordic 
countries, with a relatively high participation of men in domestic activities, and 
that in southern European countries, with a much lower participation of men. And 
while participation of men in unpaid work is to some extent beyond political 
intervention, the strong regional and national differences obviously mean that 
men and women in different countries face very different realities when 
considering having a first or a subsequent child. 
 
Figure 4: 
Child care provision, as of 2000-5
a 
Note: a- Enrolment in daycare and pre-school. The actual year of the data varies across countries, but all fall in 
the period 2000-2005. 
Source: OECD family database. Table PF11.1. Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database 
 
The key question, of course, is whether these strong regional and national 
differences in work- and gender-related contexts reflect similar differences in 
fertility. Once again, the empirical literature does not provide a conclusive answer 
to this question: it does nonetheless provide some plausible pieces of evidence. 
For example, the reviews by Andersson and by Rønsen and Skrede (pp. 89-102 
and pp. 103-123) draw a possible link between higher-than-average fertility in the 
Nordic region and the family policies in these countries. However, they note that 



























Childcare provision for children age 4



























Childcare provision for children age under 3Introduction  12 
the latter policies have been implemented for the purpose of individual needs, and 
not to increase fertility: higher fertility thus being only a by-product of those 
measures. They also point out that work-family reconciliation policies in Sweden 
are individual-oriented, not family-oriented, and therefore do not encourage 
gender segregation in the family (Andersson, pp. 89-102). 
 
Figure 5: 
Ratio of fathers’ to mothers’ time spent on child care activities (per day), around 
2000 

















Note: the data refer to married or cohabiting parents whose youngest child is under the age of seven. Child care 
activities, as defined here, refer to time directly involved with the child, for example playing with, and reading 
to, the child as well as transportation related to the child. 
Source: Data computed by the authors based on the HETUS dataset. Accessed at 
http://www.edacwowe.eu/en/frmShowGIW_indicators?v_id=14 
 
The experience in the Nordic countries with respect to family policies shows 
that higher levels of gender equality correlate with higher levels of fertility. Is 
gender equality then a prerequisite for higher fertility? McDonald (2000) supports 
this view. However, as Rønsen and Skrede (pp. 103-123) note, gender relations 
are still unequal even in the Nordic countries. In particular, the higher-than-
average fertility levels observed in these countries appear to co-exist with a 
‘gender equality light’ division of work between parents (as opposed to a higher 
level of gender equality). Similarly, the higher-than-average level of fertility 
observed in France also co-exists without significant achievements with respect to Anne H. Gauthier and Dimiter Philipov  13 
gender equality. For instance, Pailhé et al. (pp. 149-164) indicate that the 1994 
family policy reform in France extended parental leave up to the third birthday of 
the child but led to a pronounced decline in women’s labour force participation. 
Thus, while fertility, gender relations and policies may be related, their actual 
combination may reflect broader societal norms and institutions, thus preventing 
broad generalisations across countries.  
 
 
6  Other institutional barriers to fertility and related 
policies 
While governments have focused their family policies mainly on financial and 
work-related measures, other macro-level factors may constitute barriers to 
fertility as well. The article by Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto (pp.  57-87) is 
particularly interesting as it discusses the possible role of three institutional 
factors that are usually not targeted by family policies: the educational system, the 
labour market and the housing market. These factors, they argue, can have a 
significant effect on fertility, especially through its postponement to older ages. In 
turn, the postponement of childbearing may result in lower levels of fertility 
because postponed intentions to have a child may remain unrealised later in life. 
The possible link between policies and the timing of childbearing is a 
relatively new area of research and suggests that policies encouraging people to 
have their children at earlier ages may result in higher completed fertility. Lutz 
et al. (2005) call these policies tempo-related ones and argue that one way to 
achieve births earlier in life would be by shortening education (without 
compromising the actual levels of human capital) since most of the first births in 
contemporary Europe take place after the completion of education (Billari and 
Philipov 2004). 
One other way that policies may stimulate earlier childbearing is through the 
encouragement of couples to have children within short birth intervals. A specific 
policy instrument of this kind known as the ‘speed premium’ was implemented in 
Sweden in the 1990s. As discussed by Andersson (pp. 89-102) and Rønsen and 
Skrede (pp. 103-123), ‘speed premiums’ had an undeniable effect on the tempo of 




7  Future avenues of research  
We noted in the introduction that the conference did not deal with the question of 
whether governments in Europe should intervene to increase fertility. Yet, the 
European Commission indicated its support to such an intervention in recent 
documents (including its Green paper on demography and its subsequent Introduction  14 
communication),
9 and in February 2008 the European Parliament adopted a 
Resolution on the demographic future of Europe). One assumption behind this 
position is that fertility will remain low during the decades to come. Butz (pp. 35-
38) warns, however, that contemporary scientific research neither supports nor 
rejects such an assumption, and therefore policies may happen to be redundant. 
This is a valid point, especially considering the relatively poor accuracy of 
previous attempts at predicting future trends in fertility. Furthermore, policy 
interventions may have unanticipated negative effects (for example on gender 
equality) thus leading Botev (pp. 29-34) to call for a thorough assessment of the 
cost, benefits and impact of any policy.  
Still, it remains that some countries, especially in southern and eastern Europe 
have experienced very low levels of fertility for nearly two decades. The impact 
of such fertility levels on the speed of population ageing and eventual population 
decline is undeniable, putting a huge pressure on policy makers to alleviate some 
of the negative consequences. To be sure, any policy intervention is bound to be 
very expensive and may be out of reach for countries with weaker economies.  
Effective policy interventions also call for a sound understanding of the gap 
between actual fertility and desired fertility. While studies have identified some 
possible barriers to the realisation of fertility intentions, the instability of these 
intentions over the life course of individuals will require researchers to further 
investigate the broader context in which intentions are formed, altered, realised or 
not realised, both at the micro-level of individuals and at the macro-level of 
societies. In particular, and as suggested in this volume, economic obstacles to 
fertility and work-related ones may matter but so may other dimensions such as 
gender equality, the housing market and the educational system. For example, 
more possibilities for part-time work may be called for, as well as the introduction 
of tempo-policies (see Lutz in pp. 17-24). Further understanding of the barriers to 
fertility and the possible impact of policies will require access to comprehensive 
policy databases though. Thévenon (pp.  165-177) describes a number of such 
databases and illustrates how useful they can be. However, these databases will 
need to be extended to include information not only on the actual benefits 
provided by national governments but also on their eligibility criteria and take-up 
rates. They should also be complemented with information about regional as well 
as employer-provided policies.  
And while policies may have some effect on fertility, they will probably not 
prevent population ageing and population decline, thus calling for major shifts in 
the ways societies define economic success, in the ways they view and encourage 
the contribution of older members of societies, and in the ways they adapt to their 
new demographic realities.  
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